Why Lifting Capital Ratios Is Not Enough

Regulators here and overseas are forcing banks to hold more capital in order to make the banking system “more secure”. In Australia, because of the lack of true competition, this will in practice mean the banks passing additional costs through to borrowers, thus maintaining the high (on an international basis) shareholder returns. Higher capital means higher priced bank products.

However, continuing to lift capital ratios will not alone make banks more secure. There are other strategies which we need to consider if we are truly to have undoubtedly strong banks.  We need, in effect, to broaden the debate.

First, one of the main drivers of higher capital is to ensure that banks, should they get into trouble, would not be bailed out by tax payers via government intervention. In 2007, the UK the government became the major shareholder in a number of banks, which were on the brink. This led in turn to significant public debt, which has yet to be repaid. The FSI estimated that the economic cost of a severe financial sector crisis is around 158 per cent of annual GDP. For Australia, this is around $2.4 trillion. And this is just the annual cost. The question becomes how to handle banks that are too big to fail and get into difficulty. It should be essential for banks to think the unthinkable, and have in the bottom draw a secure exit plan should they get into difficulty, and this resolution plan has to be approved by the banking regulator. It should not simply be “raise more capital”, because as the APRA stress tests highlighted recently, individual banks assumed they could top up their reserves in a crisis, but did not consider the fact that everyone might be trying to do this at the same time (because of a broader crisis) as so might not be successful.

Second, and connected to the work-out plans, we think there is a case to ring-fence the retail bank operations of these large financial conglomerates, from their other operations. Risks in the treasury, wealth management, insurance, and international trade areas are potentially higher than in core retail banking. At the moment, it is all scrambled. The UK for example, to working towards adequate risk separation of core banking operations and the other elements within financial conglomerates. Whilst implementation needs to take account of the structure of individual entities, we think this is important.

Third, the obligations of the top managers in the banks with regards to complying with regulation should be clearly stated and enforced. We have seen  some banks essentially flex lending standards to maintain market share. APRA and ASIC have both highlighted these shortcomings and the RBA have admitted risks were higher than initially thought because of loose lending criteria. The obligations on top managers should have legal force, and in severe cases of non-compliance, regulators should be more overtly holding them to account personally. More broadly, this speaks to the cultural norms within the banks, and the incentives in place. It also balances the obligations of regulators and those managing the banks – at the moment, it appears the onus is too much on the regulators to try and “catch” bad behaviour, rather than having the right behaviours championed by the banks themselves. This balance needs to be recast.

Fourth, we need stronger, real competition in the banking sector, not the faux competition where everyone marches to the same tune, and follows each other with rate rises and falls. We have some of the most profitable banks in the world, thanks to weak competition, not brilliant management, or super efficiency. Regulators are more concerned with financial stability than competition, though moving the dial on IRB banks from 15-17 to 25 is a starting point, tweaking capital is not sufficient. With so many regulatory authorities involved, from ACCC, APRA, ASIC and RBA, the onus of driving real competition falls through the cracks, at the expense of Australia Inc. The FSI recommended ASIC be given a specific competition mandate.

We should not become myopic about more capital being the total solution to fixing the banking system. Structure, culture, competition and governance must all be on the table.

Author: Martin North

Martin North is the Principal of Digital Finance Analytics

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