Greek Bad Bank Potentially Positive, Likely Insufficient – Fitch

According to Fitch Ratings, the Greek government’s intention to create a “bad bank” is a positive step towards achieving reform because it recognises that high volumes of non-performing loans (NPL) are impeding new lending. Nevertheless, banking sector reform proposals included in a broader package presented to eurozone partners on 1 April 2015 appear insufficient relative to the scale of the problems faced by Greek banks, despite potential benefits for banks’ asset quality and liquidity.

The package describes banking sector deficiencies as ‘critical’. We agree with this and believe failure of the banks is a real possibility, as indicated by the ‘CCC’ ratings assigned to the country’s largest banks.

NPLs have reached staggeringly high levels. Fitch estimates that domestic NPLs at National Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank, Eurobank Ergasias and Alpha Bank (which together account for around 95% of sector assets) reached EUR72bn at end-2014, equivalent to 35% of combined domestic loans. Net of reserves, Greek NPLs reached a high EUR30bn and still exceeded the banks’ combined equity.

The proposal to create an asset management company, or bad bank, using remaining funds from the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF), to deal with NPLs is potentially positive for the banks’ asset quality. The asset manager may also help banks’ weakened liquidity position if they, for example, receive HFSF-related funds in exchange for transferred NPLs.

However, the asset manager is unlikely to provide a material near-term solution to Greek banks’ asset quality problems unless it is highly geared. This is mainly because the volume of NPLs held by Greek banks vastly exceeds the EUR10.9bn HFSF buffer that would serve as capital for the bad bank.

The funding profile of the asset manager is still unclear. Fitch notes that Spain’s bad bank model, which hinged on government guaranteed bond issuance, with bonds qualifying for discount at the ECB, is unlikely to be replicated in Greece as Greek bonds cannot currently be pledged as collateral to the ECB. Fitch anticipates that Greek banks would still need to retain (and finance) sizeable stocks of unreserved NPLs, constraining future credit growth.

Furthermore, establishing correct values for the troubled loans will be difficult given the exceptionally challenging operating conditions. Therefore any transfers to an asset manager are likely to require asset write-downs, potentially further eroding banks’ solvency.

Fitch notes that Ireland and Spain’s bad banks have helped restructure balance sheets – but in these cases, troubled loans transferred to bad banks were linked to real estate. This is not the case in Greece where impairments are spread across all segments, making it more difficult to identify loans eligible to be transferred to an asset manager and to establish appropriate haircuts.

Proposals to introduce supervisory reform are potentially positive but will also be challenging to implement within a short timeframe, particularly in view of the period of extreme stress that the country is undergoing.

The proposals include a suggestion that NPLs should be resolved in a “socially fair” manner, which along with further wording, appears to hint at potential creditor unfriendliness. Fitch is uncertain whether some debt forgiveness is on the cards and whether the proposals point to state-directed lending ambitions. Similarly, proposals include expansion of the role of the Bank of Greece to encompass consumer protection, a function which, in other countries, often includes debtor-friendly measures.

What Happens After QE?

Interesting comments from FitchRatings in their Global Perspective series.

There has long been a sense of finality about quantitative easing (QE): when policy interest rates are at or near zero, it seems the last option available to central banks in countering deflation. But this ignores other monetary and exchange rate policies implemented in the past, those recently considered implausible but being deployed at present, and additional creative ideas that may – by necessity and where possible – receive more widespread use in the future.

Ultimately, central banks control the quantity of money (narrowly defined) and exert influence over its price (the interest rate). With this in mind, it is logical to conclude that once the price of money is at its minimum, and further accommodation is desirable, central banks are left with only the quantity of money to consider. However, there are a few other policy options, although they would be likely to prove contentious and subject to questions about their effectiveness.

In the Past: Exchange Rate Interventions

Another way to express the price of money that central banks, including those in advanced economies, have at times tried to influence is the price of foreign currency, the exchange rate.

In September 1985 finance ministers and central bank governors of France, Germany, Japan, the UK and US announced in the Plaza Accord that “exchange rates should play a role in adjusting external imbalances” and that “an orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies against the dollar is desirable”. This was directed primarily at the Japanese yen/US dollar exchange rate, to reduce the US-Japan trade imbalance and the broader US current account deficit. A year later the US dollar had depreciated by 35% against the yen (see chart), and two years later US inflation was more than 4%, where it remained until mid-1991.

There are two common objections to exchange rate intervention. First, it is a zero-sum game: one country’s beneficial depreciation is at the expense of others’ appreciations. Second, intervention is ineffective in the longer term when market forces take hold.

One counter to these objections is that they are inconsistent with each other, at least over time. More importantly, policymakers may eventually conclude that it is not a zero-sum game if countries in deflation represent a broader global risk to growth. And, as with QE, doubts about the effectiveness of currency intervention may be shelved when other policy options appear to have been exhausted and policymakers need to be seen to be taking all necessary steps.

In the Present: Doing the “Unthinkable”

It seems sensible that nominal interest rates have a zero lower bound, as investors would be unlikely to buy assets that, if held to maturity, deliver a nominal loss. It also seems sensible that central banks would want to avoid pushing policy rates below zero. They have long argued that the proper functioning of financial markets would be impaired by negative nominal rates.

Nevertheless, the zero lower bound has been breached by both policymakers and the market. At end-March, the Swedish central bank repo rate, the Swiss central bank three-month LIBOR (Swiss franc) target range, and the Danish central bank certificate of deposit rate were below zero. A number of European government bond yields were also negative.

At least some objections to breaching the zero lower bound on policy interest rates have clearly been set aside, and – assuming deflationary conditions warrant it – the rationale for doing so may become more appealing. From a central bank perspective, two risks associated with negative yields are that they encourage a greater reliance on cash, taking funds outside the financial system, and there could be a run-up in credit, portending asset bubbles and financial instability.

A shift towards large-scale cash holdings in advanced economies appears improbable, if for no reason other than it being impractical. Asset price bubbles and future financial instability may present a bigger problem, but the calculus of central banks could change. If faced with the choice of immediate, intractable deflation and potential financial instability, policymakers may opt to first address the more pressing challenge.

The Future: Policy Creativity

Negative interest rates and a return of more active exchange rate policies might not be the only options to consider. The government and Nationalbank of Denmark have developed another strategy to provide additional monetary accommodation. The government is issuing no bonds until further notice, and will draw on its deposits at the central bank as needed, effectively adding to base money. This may not be an option for many countries (Danish government deposits at the Natioanlbank were large), but it underscores the potential for policy creativity.

 

Private Funds Pose Most Systemic Asset Management Risk – Fitch

Private funds, i.e. hedge funds, pose the greatest systemic risk for the investment management sector based on key risk indicators identified by the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) latest consultation paper, according to Fitch Ratings.

The paper on non-bank, non-insurance financial institutions that may pose systemic risk takes a dual approach for investment management, focusing on investment funds and asset managers, was published earlier this month. The latest FSB consultation paper identifies size (with and without regard to leverage), substitutability, interconnectedness, complexity and cross-jurisdictional activities as potential drivers of systemic risk in the investment management space. These factors are considered in the context of private less-regulated funds, regulated funds and asset managers.

The two key drivers of systemic risk are the use of excessive leverage (and associated counterparty relationships) and “substitutability,” or a fund’s gross (leveraged) size relative to its investment sector. If one or more large, heavily leveraged funds come to represent “the market,” this could introduce illiquidity in times of stress. The combination of these two factors, excessive leverage and a large market footprint, are most likely to create systemic risk in times of stress.

From this perspective, larger, leveraged private funds pose the most systemic risk in the investment management sector. Private funds are lightly regulated, and leverage constraints are far looser, reflecting counterparty risk limits rather than regulatory limits. Regulated investment funds are restricted from taking on excessive leverage. Leverage for regulated U.S. funds, measured as assets-to-net asset value, is restricted to 1.5x for senior debt, below the 3.0x or greater proposed by the FSB. In Europe, UCITs funds leverage is limited to 2.0x. This makes the transmission of systemic risk due to a forced deleveraging low for regulated funds.

Regulatory treatment of certain off-balance sheet derivative transactions represents one potential caveat. Certain derivatives are used by regulated funds in the U.S., where the regulatory treatment may not fully capture the true “economic leverage” that is incurred. For this reason, we “gross up” the balance sheets of rated funds that use derivatives to fully capture the underlying risks.

In the case of asset managers, Fitch notes that they operate primarily on an agency basis, acting on behalf of investors in their funds. As a result, asset management generally it is not a balance sheet intensive business and does not involve large amounts of leverage, maturity transformation or financial complexity. It is the funds themselves that take on leverage, to the degree allowed, utilize derivatives and have counterparty exposures.

Concentrating on unregulated private funds, with an emphasis on excessive leverage and fund-level market footprint, i.e. substitutability, may result in a more focused, nuanced approach. A deeper understanding of off-balance sheet activities at private funds and larger regulated funds also may help prudential regulators and the market identify less transparent sources of leverage and risk.

Mortgage Delinquencies Up In Q4

Fitch says that competitive lending, high house prices and low interest rates did not benefit residential mortgage performance in 4Q14, with the delinquencies in the Dinkum RMBS index increasing by 7bp to 1.15%. However, overall performance was better than a year earlier when the 30+ days delinquency ratio was 1.21%.

Fitch believes that in the current low-interest rate environment, rising unemployment will be a key driver of mortgage performance in 2015, as indicated by the 90+ days arrears increase by 3bp to 0.50% despite the strong housing market.

Self-employed and non-conforming borrowers continue to benefit from the strong Australian economy, appreciating housing market and competitive lending environment. Low-documentation (low-doc) loans are usually provided to self-employed borrowers and tend to experience four to five times the level of full-documentation (full-doc) loan delinquencies. The low-doc Dinkum Index worsened by 14bp down to 4.91%, which is better in relative terms compared to the 7bp decrease among full-doc loans.

Non-conforming loans, which are usually provided to borrowers that have an adverse credit history or do not conform to Lenders Mortgage Insurer’s (LMI) standards, continue to show strong resilience with 30+ days arrears improving to 6.70% in December 2014, down from 6.85% in September 2014. Repayment rates in the non-conforming segment have increased to pre-2008 levels, driven by refinancing in the currently competitive lending environment.

Australian house prices gained 7.9% year-on-year at December 2014. This was predominantly driven by increases in Sydney and Melbourne’s property prices. High property prices have benefited LMI claims as it reduced the likelihood of a principal shortfall on defaulted loans. In 4Q14, the Dinkum LMI payment ratio was 95.2%, compared to 93.6% in 3Q14, with an average 4Q14 LMI claim of AUD71,498, below the average cumulative LMI claim of AUD73,097.

A stable Australian economy, low interest rates, and appreciating housing market have assisted mortgage performance. Fitch expects the current rate of property price growth to be unsustainable in the long term, unless household income increases. The agency believes unemployment rate and house prices are key drivers of 90+ days arrears in the current low interest rate environment. The agency expects that the seasonal Christmas spending will be offset by the February 2015 interest-rate cut and the temporary reduction in petrol prices, in turn resulting in stable 1Q15 arrears.

 

Mortgage Arrears Higher In Mining Post Codes – Fitch

Fitch Ratings says in a new report that a reduction in mining investment and slower mining industry employment has resulted in higher delinquency rates over the past 18 months in areas where a significant population is employed in the industry, compared with delinquencies in non-mining areas.

Only 0.8% of Australian mortgages are located in mining postcodes (defined by Fitch as postcodes in which more than 20% of residents worked in the mining industry – employment based on 2011 census data). As a result, mortgages in Australia performed well overall, thanks to the stable economy, steady unemployment rate and record-low mortgage rates.

While Fitch expects the rapid change in industry dynamics that has occurred in the mining sector to impact both mortgage delinquencies and local property markets, Australian RMBS transactions are typically well-diversified geographically. As a result, Fitch does not expect the fall in mining employment to have a material effect on securitised portfolios and does not expect it to affect RMBS ratings in the medium term.

 

Rate Cut Unlikely To Cut Defaults – Fitch

Fitch Ratings says that the Reserve Bank of Australia’s move on 3 February 2015 to cut its official interest rate to 2.25% down from 2.50%, which led to mortgage rates in Australia falling to their lowest point in 50 years, is unlikely to improve the performance of domestic residential mortgage loans.

Australian variable interest rates have tracked well below historical levels for a long time, and there is little room for further improvement in mortgage performance in terms of loan defaults and delinquencies. Fitch data shows that the current delinquency rate of loans that are more than 30 days past due (a measure of borrowers who have missed one or more payments) on residential mortgages is now just 1.08%, the lowest recorded since December 2007.

Financial distress is one of the key factors that borrowers cite when they default on mortgages. However, interest rates are already at low levels, while household finances have improved following lower petrol prices, both of which mean that now is one of the least likely times for borrowers who remain employed, to be unable to pay. Fitch is of the view that a 25bps cut in rates will have no impact on mortgage performance.

Any defaults in the current environment will be due to other key factors such as sickness, business bankruptcy and divorce, which are unaffected by interest rates. Fitch remains vigilant for over-commitment of borrowers and poor underwriting in the mortgage market, although there is little evidence of such practices now.

Fitch currently rates 139 Australian residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) transactions and five covered bond programmes which include over 1.4 million individual housing loans as collateral. These loans represent approximately 18% of the Australian housing loan market and so provide a good proxy for the market as a whole.

 

House Price Growth Set To Fall – Fitch

Fitch Ratings “Global Housing and Mortgage Outlook” suggests House price growth is expected to moderate across the Asia-Pacific region in 2015, driven by government regulatory pressures, tightened affordability and gradual interest-rate rises. The growth slowdown will be led by Australia, where national house prices are forecast to rise 4% in 2015, down from 7% in 2014, and in Hong Kong, where Fitch expects prices to be flat as compared to the 10% growth in 2014.

These forecasts are featured in Fitch’s latest Global Housing and Mortgage Outlook, published on 14 January. Of the six APAC countries included in the report, only Korea is expected to have price gains that exceed that in 2014; even then, it is forecast to be just 2%.

Australia will see house-price increases slow in 2015, down to 3%-4% in Sydney and Melbourne, and flat in Perth. Affordability pressures will remain in Australia’s largest cities, with price rises continuing to outstrip income growth, and home prices approaching the affordability ceiling. Lending volumes will continue to grow as investment activity is expected to remain high; investment loans are expected to continue to account for 50% of new lending. That said, as rental yields drop to less than 3.5%, Fitch stresses that housing investors’ buying sentiment could be vulnerable to weakening if other asset classes offer better returns.

Government policy action, pressured affordability and the likelihood of interest-rate rises in the long term will continue to be key themes for the housing and mortgage outlook in the APAC region. A gradual increase in mortgage rates is expected in 2015 and 2016 in Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore, all of which show relatively high interest rate sensitivity. At the same time, governments and regulatory authorities are targeting soft landings for the housing market in several economies including New Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore, which have seen rapid price growth over the past decade.

Hong Kong is a case in point, where Fitch believes macro-prudential measures will lead to a marked slowdown in price growth. Home prices are forecast to be to be flat this year versus a 10% increase in 2014, and an average gain of 15% over the previous decade. The government’s cooling measures should stabilise affordability at current levels, though home prices already are highly stretched relative to incomes. Fitch maintains that Hong Kong does risk a downturn, considering the combination of the stretched affordability, rising rates, and the large involvement of speculative investments in the sector.

Similar macro-prudential measures in Singapore and New Zealand are having the desired impact on markets by dampening house price movements.

Singapore and Australia, Japan and South Korea are expected to see government measures to support the housing sector, in contrast to Hong Kong.